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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION- FAIRNESS DOC-
TRINE-REQUIREMENT THAT A FAIRNESS DOCTRINE COMPLAINT Es-
TABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE DEFINING A SPECIFIC ISSUE.
American Security Council Education Foundation v.
Federal Communications Commission (D.C. Cir. 1979)
In September, 1976, the American Security Council Education Founda-
tion (ASCEF)1 submitted to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) a fairness doctrine complaint 2 against the Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. (CBS).3 The complaint, founded upon ASCEF's re-
cently completed study of the network's news programs, charged CBS with
failing to present a balance of viewpoints in its news and public affairs
broadcasts, asserting specifically that the CBS Evening News adopted a de-
cidedly "dovish" stance on matters pertaining to national security. 4 ASCEF
1. The American Security Council Education Foundation described itself as "a nonprofit
educational institution whose purpose is to improve public understanding of facts and issues
relating to the national security of this country." American See. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC,
607 F.2d 438, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, C.J., concurring), quoting Brief for Petitioner at 1.
2. 607 F.2d at 442. Under the fairness doctine, "[t]he Federal Communications Commis-
sion has for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that
discussion of public issues be presented . . and that each side of those issues must be given fair
coverage." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969). Applying the doc-
trine, the FCC attempts to insure that the American broadcasting system is operated in the
public interest. 607 F.2d at 443. For the duties imposed by the fairness doctrine, see notes
22-26 and accompanying text infra. As explained by the American Security Council court,
"[firom its inception, the doctrine's goal has been to promote the Iparamount right of the public
in a free society to be informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or rejection the
different attitudes and viewpoints concerning [the] vital and often controversial issues which are
held by various groups which make up the community.' " 607 F.2d at 442, quoting Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). To achieve this goal, the
fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to devote a reasonable percentage of air time to contro-
versial issues of public importance and to provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation
of opposing views on such issues. Id. See also Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891,
910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
3. In re American Sec. Council Educ. Found., 63 F.C.C.2d 366 (1977). Accompanying the
complaint was a book, E. Lefever, T. V. and National Defense (1974), describing the study upon
which the complaint was based, as well as a press release and news articles concerning the
book. 63 F.C.C.2d at 366. The contents of the book were incorporated into the complaint by
reference. Id.
4. 607 F.2d at 460-62 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). ASCEF undertook a study to determine the
veracity of what it perceived to be a dovish bias in the broadcast media's presentation of issues
which it broadly categorized as relating to national security. Id. at 460 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Led by Ernest W. Lefever, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, eleven research analysts
studied transcripts of all CBS Evening News programs televised during 1972. Id. at 461 (Wil-
key, J., dissenting). ASCEF chose CBS because it had the largest news audience and the
greatest number of affiliated stations. Id. Lefever reduced national security to four components:
1) United States military and foreign affairs; 2) Soviet military and foreign policy; 3) Chinese
military and foreign policy; and 4) Vietnam affairs. Id. Researchers then dissected the transcripts
(386)
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asked the Commission to find CBS in violation of the fairness doctrine 5 and
to require that the network provide a reasonable opportunity for the expres-
sion of opposing views on the matter of national security6 as well as
"compensatory time for such expression to balance the years of non-
coverage." 7
In dismissing ASCEF's complaint, 8 the FCC found that the complaint
failed to meet the pleading requirement of presenting a prima facie case 9
because it did not frame precisely a particular, well-defined, controversial
issue of public importance. 10 On appeal, a divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
FCC ruling, finding that the Commission had abused its discretion in dis-
missing ASCEF's complaint, 1 and ordered the FCC to demand a response
from CBS. 1 2
On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed the panel and
reinstated the FCC's original ruling, holding that "ASCEF (had) failed to
into sentences and characterized each sentence as representing one of three viewpoints: 1) the
threat to U.S. security is more serious than perceived by the government; 2) present govern-
ment threat perception is essentially correct; and 3) the threat to U.S. security is less serious
than perceived by the government. Id. at 442. According to ASCEF's study, CBS presented the
third viewpoint approximately 61% of the time, the second viewpoint 35% of the time, and the
first viewpoint 4% of the time, thereby evidencing a dovish bias. Id. at 462 (Wilkey, J., dissent-
ing).
5. Id. at 443. In its complaint, ASCEF stated that, pursuant to FCC regulations, it had
notified CBS directly of its grievance in a letter dated October 15, 1974. See In re American
Sec. Council Educ. Found., 63 F.C.C.2d at 367. CBS had replied to this letter of grievance
stating that, in its opinion, the fairness doctrine had not been violated. Id.
6. In re American Sec. Council Educ. Found., 63 F.C.C.2d at 367.
7. id.
8. Id. at 370.
9. Id. at 368. The Commission stated:
Because of the delicate First Amendment considerations involved in this area, a com-
plainant must establish a prima facie case on non-compliance with the fairness doctrine
before the Commission will take action.
... Part of the complainant's evidentiary burden in establishing a prima facie case
[of non-compliance] is to define precisely the specific issue of public importance pre-
sented.
Id. at 368. For a description of the factors required to present a prima facie case, see notes
42-45 and accompaning text infra.
10. 63 F.C.C.2d at 368. See note 9 supra. Additionally, the FCC found that ASCEF's com-
plaint did not sufficiently present evidence of an absence of opportunity to present the opposing
side in CBS's overall programming, and questioned the validity of ASCEF's method of establish-
ing bias. 63 F.C.C.2d at 368-69.
11. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, No. 77-1443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1978),
reprinted in 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1516 (BNA). Writing for the panel, Judge Wilkey described the
FCC's finding that ASCEF's complaint was not based upon a well-defined issue as "willful
obtuseness," a phrase he would echo in his blistering dissent to the later en bane decision. No.
77-1443, reprinted in 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1516, 1522 (BNA). See 607 F.2d at 465 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting); note 100 and accompanying text infra. Judge Wilkey further asserted that the issue
examined in ASCEF's study was presented clearly as "whether this nation should do more, less
or the same about perceived threats to its national security." No. 77-1443, reprinted in MEDIA
L. REP. at 1522 (BNA) (emphasis in original). To evidence the clarity of the issue, Judge Wilkey
noted that the authors of 30 articles discussing the report upon which the complaint was based
"discerned [the issue] with perfect comprehension." Id.
12. American Sec. Council Educ. Found. v. FCC, No. 77-1443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 13, 1978),
reprinted in 4 MEDIA L. REP. 1516 (BNA).
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base its complaint on a particular, well-defined issue because (1) the indirect
relationships among the issues aggregated by ASCEF under the umbrella of
'national security' do not provide a basis for determining whether the public
received a reasonable balance of conflicting views, and (2) a contrary re-
sult would unduly burden broadcasters without a countervailing benefit to
the public's right to be informed."l1 American Security Council Education
Foundation v. Federal Communications Commission, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
The fairness doctrine, which applies to radio, television, and other
forms of licensed electronic communication, 14 finds its statutory foundation
in the Radio Act of 1927.15 That Act created the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC) to, among other things, assign frequencies, regulate broadcasting ap-
paratus, hold hearings, and make regulations "in a way responsive to the
public convenience, interest or necessity." 16
Seeking to cultivate robust debate on all sides of controversial issues,17
the newly created FRC, acting under the Radio Act's "public convenience,
interest or necessity" I language, not only required broadcasters to provide
for a right to reply to controversial expressions of opinions, but also abso-
lutely prohibited them from expressing personal editorial views. 19 As these
requirements evolved into the fairness doctrine in its present form, the FCC
replaced the FRC 20 and ultimately dropped the provision prohibiting the
expression of personal editorial opinions by broadcasters.
2
'
13. 607 F.2d at 448.
14. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969).
15. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed by the Communications
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102-03). The Radio Act of 1927 evolved out of
four national radio conferences held between 1922 and 1925 in response to public pressure on
the government to organize the then uncontrolled use of the airwaves, and to systematize the
sporadic reception of broadcasts provided to the radio-hungry American public. Simmons, Fair-
ness Doctrine: The Early History, 29 FED. CoM. B.J. 207, 219-24 (1976).
16. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (repealed by Communi-
cations Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 602-94, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102-03). Thus, it appears that
the initial nature and justification for governmental intervention in electronic communications
was purely technical-a reaction to the chaos resulting from uncontrolled use of the airwaves.
See Simmons, supra note 15, at 218.
17. See Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC, 3 F.R.C. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). In Great Lakes, the
FRC stated that "public interest requires ample play for the free and fair competition of oppos-
ing views, and the [Federal Radio] [C]ommission believes that the principle applies . . . to all
discussions of issues of importance to the public." 3 F.R.C. at 33.
18. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (repealed by Coinmuni-
cations Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 602-94, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102-03).
19. See In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940). See generally Simmons,
supra note 15, at 256-58.
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-119, 151 (1976). The Communications Act of 1934 replaced the Federal
Radio Commission with the FCC, transferring most of the duties and powers of the old Com-
mission to the FCC. Pub. L. No. 73-416, §§ 602-604, 48 Stat. 1064, 1102-03 (current version at
47 U.S.C. §§ 81-119 (1976)).
2f. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969).
[VOL. 25: p. 386
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As applied by the FCC 22 and the courts,2 3 the fairness doctrine imposes
a two-pronged duty: 24 the broadcaster must cover a wide range of contro-
versial issues of public importance in his overall programming and, having
done so, must provide a reasonable opportunity for the expression of oppos-
ing views.2 5  This construction of the doctrine was statutorily endorsed by
Congress in 1959.26
First amendment questions 27 regarding the fairness doctrine restric-
tions on the media reached the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC,2 8 a 1969 case in which the Court unanimously, though some-
what qualifiedly, 2 9 approved the FCC's construction and Congress' codifica-
tion of the doctrine. 30 Answering a first amendment challenge to the FCC's
22. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). In this report, the FCC
set forth the two-pronged duty of the fairness doctrine, basing this duty on public interest,
convenience, and necessity. Id. at 1249. See also In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in
Handling Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1963).
23. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); Brandywine-Mainline
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 38-46 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 327-29
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
24. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969); Fairness Report, 48
F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974).
25. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969). The fairness doctrine is
designed to encourage the "robust and wide open debate" identified by the Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as crucial to our democratic system and
the paramount aim of the first amendment. Id. at 270.
26. Communications Act Amendments of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (cur-
rent version at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 380-82 (1969). In the 1959 amendments, Congress stated that there is no exception "from
the obligation imposed upon [broadcasters] under this Act to operate in the public interest and
afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of conflicting views on issues of public Importance."
Communications Act Amendments of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976) ). Relying on this language, the Red Lion Court found that
Congress had legislatively adopted the FCC's policy requiring broadcasters to treat all sides of
controversial issues of public importance. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
380 (1969).
27. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). In Paramount,
the Court expressly stated that broadcasting clearly qualifies for first amendment protection. Id.
Furthermore, in the Communications Act of 1934, Congress recognized the electronic media's
first amendment rights by forbidding the FCC to censor this industry. See 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1976). Thus, the application of the fairness doctrine is subject to first amendment restrictions as
well as specific statutory limitations.
28. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, an author alleged that a radio show host's critique of
his book amounted to a personal attack, and demanded free time for reply under the FCC's
personal attack regulations. Id. at 371-72. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1979). The FCC agreed with
the complainant and ordered the station to comply with his request for time. 395 U.S. at 372.
The radio station appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and its
component rules. Id. at 370.
In affirming the FCC decision, the Supreme Court held that the specific application of the
fairness doctrine in Red Lion by the FCC was authorized by Congress and enhanced, rather
than abridged, first amendment freedoms. Id. at 375.
29. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's concerns in approving the constitutionality of
the fairness doctrine, see notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
30. 395 U.S. at 400-01. In endorsing the validity of the FCC's construction and Congress's
1959 codification of the fairness doctrine, the Supreme Court in Red Lion stated:
Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight
in statutory construction. And here this principle is given special force by the equally
1979-1980]
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authority to interfere in any way with broadcasting, the Court raised the
traditional technical limitations, 31 stating: "Where there are substantially
more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allo-
cate, it is idle to posit an unabridgable First Amendment right to broad-
cast . 3.."32 The Court further noted that it is the public's right to be
informed, not the licensees' right to broadcast, which is the paramount con-
cern of the first amendment.33
Although the Court emphatically endorsed the purposes and principles
of the fairness doctrine, as well as the FCC's authority to enforce it through
regulations, 34 the Court did not specifically "approve every aspect of the
fairness doctrine," nor did it "ratify every past and future decision by the
FCC with regard to programming." 35 Rather, the Court qualified its ap-
proval to some extent by acknowledging the spectre of potential first
amendment infringement inherent in the doctrine. 36
Given the first amendment controversies created by the fairness doc-
trine, the Commission3 7 and the courts 38 have recognized that restraint in its
venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution
should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong, especially
when Congress has refused to alter the administrative construction. Here, the Congress
has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative construction, but
has ratified it with positive legislation.
Id. at 380-82 (footnotes omitted).
31. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
32. 395 U.S. at 388. See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213
(1943); Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 3 (1974).
33. 395 U.S. at 390. See also note 2 supra.
34. 395 U.S. at 380-82. The Supreme Court concluded that broadcasters were given the
privilege to use the airwaves as proxies or trustees for the entire community, and that no first
amendment right existed allowing a licensee to monopolize a frequency. Id. at 389, 394. Citing
the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Court relied on "differences in the characteristics of new
media" to justify differences in first amendment standards applied to them. Id. at 386, 390.
Finally, the Court emphasized the necessity to share the airwaves, stressing that the "people as
a whole retain their interest" in free speech on the radio. Id. at 390.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id. at 393. Considering the possibility that enforcement of the fairness doctrine could
induce self-censorship among broadcasters who might become afraid to deal with controversial
issues, the Court stated: "Such a result would indeed be a serious matter, for should licensees
actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues, the purposes of the doctrine would be
stifled." Id. The Court, however, dismissed this possibility for the present, stating that if the
fears of fairness doctrine critics materialize and experience indicates that the volume of news
coverage has been reduced because of the fairness doctrine's restrictions, then it will be time to
reconsider the constitutional implications. Id. Maintaining that "[t]he fairness doctrine in the
past has had no such overall effect," the Court expressed confidence that the possibility of
self-censorship in the communications inudstry was speculative at best. Id.
Fears of fairness doctrine abuses, however, continue to concern some jurists. See Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973); Straus Communi-
cations Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Columbia Broadcasting Court,
for instance, noted that the first amendment problems of regulation are rendered more difficult
because the broadcast industry is dynamic ...; solutions adequate a decade ago are not neces-
sarily so now." 412 U.S. at 103. See also id. at 162-64 (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. See Memorandum Order and Opinion on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58
F.C.C.2d 691, 694 (1976); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1250-51
(1949).
38. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973); Straus Communications Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
[VOL. 25: p. 386
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enforcement is crucial. The doctrine's requirements, which tread so closely
to constitutional infringement, must be clearly defined, 39 accurately cir-
cumscribed, 40 and restrictively applied. 41  To this end, the Commission has
set forth precise procedural standards for bringing a fairness doctrine com-
plaint. 4 2  As applied by the FCC, 43 the standards require the applicant to
39. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973); The Handling of Public Issues
Under the Fairness Doctrine, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 694 (1976). In this FCC report, the Commis-
sion outlined specific procedural requirements and "'substantial guidelines upon which both the
viewer and the licensee may rely." Id.
40. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973). In deciding the constitutional-
ity of an Oklahoma law regulating the political activities of state workers, the Supreme Court in
Broadrick stated:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that
statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of
expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society.
Id.
41, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 900-01 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 843 (1972). In this case, the court endorsed the Commission's restrictive policy which
limits Commission review to determining whether the licensee's decision is a reasonable, good
faith action. 460 F.2d at 900. The Commission will not substitute its judgment for that of the
licensee and will allow for considerable journalistic discretion. Id., citing In re Applicability of
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598
(1964).
42. In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in The Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1963). The FCC stated that its purpose in issuing this report
was to advise licensees and the public of their rights, obligations, and responsibilities under the
fairness doctrine. Id. The Commission detailed five factors which it expected to be specified by
the complainant, noting that its intention in doing so was to "reduce significantly the number of
complaints made to the Commission." Id. at 600. For a list of these five factors, see note 44
infra.
In a subsequent case, the Commission made the advised procedure mandatory and tied it
to the first amendment policy of protecting the licensee from undue burdens. In re Allen C.
Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1970). The Phelps opinion stated that the complainant was required
to "'(a) specify the particular broadcast in which the controversial issue was presented, (b) state
the position advocated in such broadcasts, and (c) set forth reasonable ground for concluding
that the licensee in his overall programing [sic] has not attempted to present opposing views on
the issue." Id. (citation omitted). These requirements became known as the Phelps standard,
which represents a frequently employed formulation of the procedure for bringing a fairness
doctrine complaint. In announcing this standard, the Commission explained:
Absent detailed and specific evidence of failure to comply with the requirements of
the fairness doctrine, it would be unreasonable to require licensees specifically to dis-
prove allegations such as those made [in Phelps]. The Commission's policy of encouraging
robust, wide-open debate on issues of public importance would in practice be defeated if,
on the basis of vague and general charges of unfairness, we should impose upon licensees
the burden of proving the contrary by producing recordings or transcripts of all news
programs, editorials, commentaries and discussion of public issues, many of which are
treated over long periods of time.
Id.
Finally, in 1974, the Commission revised its procedural manual, emphatically spelling out
for the public that a fairness doctrine complainant must establish a prima facie case, and setting
forth the Phelps factors as the elements comprising such a pleading. Broadcast Procedure Man-
ual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1974). For an elaboration of the Phelps factors, see note 44 infra.
43. In 1976, the Commission described the entire fairness doctrine procedure as follows:
After the complainant has ...[met the prima facie case requirement], the licensee is
called upon to answer an inquiry by the Commission staff which recites the issue specified
by the complaint. The licensee is asked whether that issue is a controversial issue of
1979-1980]
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specify, inter alia,4 4 "the particular issue of a controversial nature discussed
over the air." 45  In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee,46 the Supreme Court endorsed this prima facie case re-
quirement of the FCC. 4 7
Notwithstanding judicial approval of the prima facie requirement, 48
voices from within the FCC 49 and from without 5" have questioned the re-
public importance, whether the program in question addressed that issue, and whether
other programming has been or will be presented on that issue.
Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 696-97 (1976). The Commission then
determines whether the licensee's responses to that inquiry are reasonable. Id. at 697. Critical
in this determination is the Commission's policy that the licensee is to be granted broad discre-
tion regarding these answers and the editorial decisions they reflect. Id. The Commission does
not substitute its judgment for the licensee's. Id. See also Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC,
460 F.2d 891, 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). Furthermore, if judicial
review of the FCC's decision is sought, the court's role is simply to determine whether the
action of the Commission was based on findings supported by evidence and pursuant to the
authority granted to the FCC by Congress. 460 F.2d at 912.
44. The FCC requires that the complaint contain specific information regarding
(1) the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial nature discussed
over the air; (3) the date and time when the program was carried; (4) the basis for the
claim that the station has presented only one side of the question; and (5) whether the
station had afforded, or has plans to afford, an opportunity for the presentation of contrast-
ing viewpoints.
In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 600 (1963).
45. id.
46. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
47. Id. at 102. The Court noted the careful balancing of interests entailed in administering
the fairness doctrine, and recognized the vital role which the FCC's regulatory scheme plays in
this delicate process. Id.
48. See id.; Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 907 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 843 (1972); Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
49. See Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58
F.C.C.2d 691, 703 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Robinson observed:
"In the face of increasing demands to redress fairness grievances the Commission has evolved
procedural barriers, such as the 'Phelps Doctrine,' . . . to forestall becoming too easily involved
in licensee programming judgments." Id. at 710 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner
Robinson's dissent, however, did not favor applying the fairness doctrine with less restraint;
rather, he suggested its retirement. Id. at 711 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
Commissioner Johnson's dissent to the FCC's dismissal of In re Diocesan Union of Holy
Name Societies, 43 F.C.C.2d 548 (1973), launched a frontal attack on the Commission's applica-
tion of the prima facie requirement, calling it "a procedural straightjacket." Id. at 548 (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting). He continued with a scathing attack on the Commission's decision, stating:
The effect of the Commission's action is to sanction a procedural requirement which
discourages public complaints, and literally rips the heart out of the fairness doctrine.
While it is true that the death knell of the doctrine has, of late, been sounded rather
frequently, it seems chicken-hearted to destroy it on as flimsy a procedural infirmity as
the Commission has chosen today.
Id. at 550 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
50. See National Citizen's Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1097, 1111
(D.C. Cir. 1977). In National Citizen's, the court considered three petitions challenging aspects
of the FCC's Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). 567 F.2d at 1097. While the court left the
Report itself undistrubed, it instructed the FCC to further investigate suggestions for alternative
approaches to achieve the goals of the fairness doctrine. Id. Addressing specifically the pro-
cedural requirements for bringing a fairness doctrine complaint, the court noted that as
[a]n unavoidable consequence of those procedures .. .complaints will not be received, or
will not be acted upon, unless there exist persons organizations who are simultaneously
392 [VOL. 25: p. 386
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quirement's validity. One element generating substantial litigation 5 1 is that
which requires a fairness doctrine complaint to focus upon a"'particular issue
of a controversial nature." 52  Dealing with the degree of specificity required
in a complaint, the FCC in In re Hakki S. Tamimie 53 found that the com-
plainant's broad categorization of the "Middle East" as an issue lacked such
specificity because it did not identify a particular aspect of what the Com-
mission decided was too general a topic. 54 Subsequently, however, in In re
Council on Children, Media and Merchandising,55 the Commission found
that while the complainant had stated the "children's advertising" issue in
three different ways, the Commission could fairly treat all three formulations
as saying essentially the same thing. 56 This decision showed a tendency on
the Commission's part to search a lay person's inartful pleadings in order to
find their inherent meaning. 57 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit showed much the same tendency in the 1971 case of
Green v. FCC. 58
In Green, the court reviewed an FCC decision to dismiss a com-
plaint.5 9 Judge Wilkey, 6 ° writing for the panel, did move past the
"regular" viewers or listeners of the relevant station, aware that there exist opposing
points of view to that presented by the station, and interested enough in having those
opposing views aired that they are willing to initiate a Commission inquiry into the mat-
ter.
Id. at 1111.
51. See In re Council on Children, Media and Merchandising, 59 F.C.C.2d 448 (1976); In
re Hakki S. Tamimie, 42 F.C.C.2d 876 (1973); In re Horace P. Rowley, 39 F.C.C.2d 437
(1973).
52. See In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues
of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1963). For the elements which must be included in a
complaint under the prima facie rule, see notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
53. 42 F.C.C.2d 876 (1973).
54. Id. at 877.
55. 59 F.C.C.2d 448 (1976).
56. Id. at 452. The Commission identified the three formulations in this complaint as fol-
lows: 1) "Whether, in view of a child's inability to critically evaluate advertisements, children
should be exposed to commercials that urge them to use, consume and purchase various prod-
ucts;" 2) "whether children should be solicited by commercial messages and how those mes-
sages should be regulated;" and 3) "whether children should ever be exposed to advertising
without at least being informed as to its techniques and intent." Id. The Commission synthe-
sized these issues into one: "Whether in view of a child's inability to critically evaluate adver-
tisements, children should ever be exposed to commercials that urge them to use, consume and
purchase various products unless those children are also informed as to the techniques and
purposes of product advertising." Id.
57. Compare id. with Dioguardi v. During, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). In Dioguardi,
Circuit Judge Clark reversed the lower court's dismissal of a complaint on demurrer stating that
"however inartistically they may be stated, [if) the plaintiff has disclosed his claims [to the
court]" he should not be deprived of his day in court. Id. The Dioguardi decision is particularly
applicable to the fairness doctrine procedure since it involved a home-drawn pleading. The
FCC encourages lay-person involvement in fairness doctrine matters, noting that effective en-
forcement of the doctrine depends on the efforts of concerned citizens. See Broadcast Procedure
Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1974).
58. 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
59. Id. at 324.
60. It should be noted that Judge Wilkey authored the lengthy dissent to the American
Security Council case, focusing his criticism, for the most part, on the majority's failure to
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petitioner's generally stated issue of "military recruitment" to analyze five
subissues which he identified from the petitioner's presentation of the
case. 61 After considering the allegations made as to each identifiable sub-
issue, the court affirmed the FCC's dismissal of the complaint. 62 While the
Green court was willing to sort through the petitioner's evidence and find
sufficiently specific subtopics in the pleading, it clearly did not discount the
need for specificity, stating: "[ilt is not only necessary to define a controver-
sial issue of public importance, but implicitly it is first necessary to define
the issue." 63
Against this background, the American Security Council court 6 4 began
its analysis by identifying the court's function in reviewing a decision made
by the FCC to be that of determining "whether the Commission's order is
unreasonable or in contravention of a statutory purpose." 6 5  The court
acknowledged its traditional deference to the Commission's judgments in
fairness doctrine cases, noting that the FCC's experience is entitled to "great
weight." 66
Proceeding to analyze the FCC's decision, the American Security Coun-
cil court first undertook a detailed examination of the fairness doctrine. 67
While noting the Supreme Court's approval in Red Lion of the doctrine's
constitutionality, 68 the court here emphasized Red Lion's recognition of the
possible chilling effect that overzealous enforcement might have. 69 The
search for subissues. 607 F.2d 466-69 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See also note 96-101 and accom-
panying text infra.
61. 447 F.2d at 329. The issues considered by the court concerned voluntary military re-
cruitment, the draft, the Vietnam War, the morality of participating in any war, and the desir-
ability of military service. Id.
62. Id. at 329-31. As to three of the subissues identified, the court found that the petitioner
had not alleged reporting imbalance with respect to these now more narrowly defined topics.
Id. Regarding the fourth, the court found that the issue itself had not been raised by the
broadcaster. Id. at 331. Turning to the fifth, the court took judicial notice of what it deemed to
be a comprehensive, well-balanced presentation of the controversy. Id.
The result in Green demonstrates the practicality and necessity of defining a specific issue
in a fairness complaint. While the court was able to sort out five specific issues from the mate-
rial presented by the petitioner, because these issues had not been properly framed, key allega-
tions and showings of fact were absent in each instance. Id. at 324, 329-34.
63. Id. at 329.
64. 607 F.2d at 441. Circuit Judge Tamm wrote the opinion for the court and was joined by
Judges McGowan, Leventhal, and Robinson in this 4:1:1:3 decision. Id. Chief Judge Wright and
Judge Bazelon filed separate concurrences, and Judge Wilkey filed a dissent. Id.
65. Id. at 447, quoting Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 912 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
66. 607 F.2d at 448, quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
67. See 607 F.2d at 443-47. The court noted that the fairness doctrine aims at promoting the
paramount right of the public to be informed. Id. at 443. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. at 376; text accompanying note 33 supra.
68. 607 F.2d at 443-44, citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 389-90. For a
discussion of Red Lion, see notes 27-36 and accompanying text supra.
69. 607 F.2d at 444. The American Security Council court stated: "[Almbitious enforcement
could lead broadcasters to reduce coverage of controversial public issues, or to cover those
issues blandly, in an attempt to avoid fairness complaints." Id. For the Red Lion Court's consid-
eration of the potential chilling effect of the fairness doctrine, see note 36 supra.
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court noted with approval the FCC's restraint in administering the doc-
trine 70 and insisted that the Commission's policy decision affording broadcast-
ers maximum discretion 71 was central to the constitutional administration of
the regulatory scheme. 72  Responding to Red Lion's cautionary words, 73 the
court found that endorsement of ASCEF's notion of an issue 74 would create
precedent that might seriously affect news programming by causing broad-
casters to forego coverage of controversial issues. 75  The court concluded
this part of its analysis by emphasizing that ASCEF's "blunderbuss ap-
proach" would contribute little toward the goals of the first amendment,
while posing all the dangers associated with government intervention. 76
The court also focused upon the procedure for bringing a fairness doc-
trine complaint, 7 7 specifically examining the prima facie evidence stan-
dard. 78  This standard, according to the court, is "part of the delicate
balance of allocating burdens" 79 and is therefore essential before "the broad-
caster will be required to establish compliance." °80 Turning to ASCEF's
contention that "national security" constituted a well-defined issue in satisfac-
tion of the "particular issue" requirement of the prima facie evidence rule,
the court noted that ASCEF had actually aggregated a number of individual
issues that it found related to national security, using a broad umbrella con-
cept."' Although the court agreed that it was .possible for a fairness doctrine
complaint to be based on an issue consisting of separate subissues,8 2 it
70. 607 F.2d at 445. See note 41 supra.
71. 607 F.2d at 445. See notes 41 & 43 supra.
72. 607 F.2d at 445.
73. See notes 36 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
74. 607 F.2d at 449. While ASCEF defined the issue broadly as "national security," the
court found that this definition was too vague, and that the topic presented by ASCEF actually
consisted of a variety of related and unrelated subissues. Id.
75. Id. at 451. The court expressed its fear that journalists might become overly burdened
by being "required to decide whether any of the day's newsworthy events is tied, even tangen-
tially, to events covered in the past," and whether a report balances or imbalances coverage. Id.
Such a result, the court found, would be unacceptable and contrary to the public interest. Id.
76. Id. at 451-52. Looking to the purpose of the fairness doctrine procedure and the
philosophy of the FCC in applying it, the court found that acceptance of the broad topic of
"national security" as a particular issue would subject the broadcaster to an unwarranted burden
in attempting to produce evidence of compliance. Id. at 450-51. The court stated that unless the
broadcaster can recognize the issue with precision and accuracy, it becomes impossible to de-
termine which broadcasts should be included in building a case, or how the views expressed
over long periods of time should be tallied to measure the "balance" which the fairness doctrine
requires. Id. at 451.
77. Id. at 445-47. See notes 42-45 supra.
78. 607 F.2d at 445. The court stated that "prima facie evidence consists of specific factual
information which, in the absence of rebuttal, is sufficient to show that a fairness doctrine
violation exists." Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 446, quoting Memorundum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fair-
ness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 696 (1976).
80. 607 F.2d at 446. The court noted that the FCC rarely finds that a prime facie case has
been made out, as is evidenced by 1973 figures which indicate that only four percent of all
fairness complaints lodged that year required the filing of a response by the licensee. Id. at 447.
81. Id. at 448-49. The court observed that ASCEF joined broadcasts relating to SALT, am-
nesty for draft evaders, detente with China, the Vietnam war, the B-1 Bomber, and the Presi-
dent's trip to China under its broad umbrella issue. Id. at 449.
82. Id. at 449 & n. 37, citing In re Horace P. Rowley, 39 F.C.C.2d 437, 442 (1973).
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pointed out that to do so, the component issues must be found to bear some
resemblance or relation so that an opinion on one issue necessarily conflicts
or agrees with an opinion on another in a way that can be found to state a
view regarding the overall issue.8 3 The court held that ASCEF's complaint
failed in this respect,8 4 and that, because the pleading had not framed a
well-defined issue, it would be impossible to decide whether a balance of
opinion had been presented in the broadcasts.8 5 Thus, noting that the
prima facie requirement is designed to weed out complaints that would
"burden broadcasters without sufficient likelihood that a countervailing ben-
efit will be gained,"8' 6 the court upheld the FCC's dismissal of ASCEF's
complaint on the ground that ASCEF had not made out a prima facie case.8 7
In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Wright expressly emphasized cer-
tain of the majority's arguments, stressing especially the complaint's lack of
specificity."8 Chief Judge Wright went on to anticipate and reject one of
the dissent's criticisms of the majority decision 8 9-what he termed, the dis-
gruntled school student's argument that if the study was good, the pro-
cedural hurdle which it failed to overcome must be bad.90 Acknowledging
83. 607 F.2d at 449-50.
84. Id. The court found than an issue was not defined with sufficient particularity if, in
viewing the evidence presented, an average citizen could not determine whether a balance of
views was struck in the broadcaster's presentations. Id. at 450. Under ASCEF's approach, a
broadcast containing a view on SALT would be expected either to conflict with or to support a
broadcast containing a view on amnesty for draft evaders, detente with China, or the Vietnam
war. Id. at 449. The court, however, found that a view on any of these topics contributed little,
if anything, toward informed evaluation of a view on any of the other topics, and provided no
basis for determining whether the broadcaster had presented a reasonable balance of opinions.
id.
85. Id. at 449. The court emphasized that the nexus between the subissues must be such
that the "average viewers or listeners can be expected to believe that expression of a view on
one supports or refutes a view on another. Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 452.
87. Id. The court directed its analysis only to ASCEF's use of "national security" as an
issue, and gave only tacit acknowledgement to the additional grounds enumerated by the FCC
for dismissal. Id. at 448. In its decision, the FCC had first relied upon the absence of a well-
defined issue, but continued by raising questions concerning 1) the validity of the viewpoint
analysis used to establish bias; 2) the complaint's failure to show that there was no reasonable
opportunity offered for airing opposing viewpoints; and 3) the limitation of the scope of the
study. In re American Sec. Council Educ. Found., 63 F.C.C.2d at 368-70.
88. 607 F.2d at 453-59 (Wright, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Wright revealed some of the
vagueness of the ASCEF issue by noting a number of meanings which can be attached to the
idea of "national security":
To some, national security means devoting the bulk of our national resources to creating
the ideal society-one, that is, whose economic dynamism and social amenities are attrac-
tive to citizens of foreign powers and thus likely to channel the currents of world ideology
in our direction. To others, this is nonsense: national security translates literally into
military superiority. Still others take a more discriminating view and seek to arrive at a
secure compromise between domestic improvements and military might.
Id. at 454-55 (Wright, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Chief Judge Wright, contending that
ASCEF failed to attribute a particular meaning to national security, observed that "ASCEF's
complaint before the FCC ...described national security variously in terms of 'the basic con-
flict relationship and the relative military balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.'; 'Soviet
and Chinese political and military objectives'; and 'domestic foreign policy.' " Id. at 455
(Wright, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
89. See id. at 468 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 454 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
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the quality and comprehensiveness of the study, the Chief Judge pointed out
that a good study did not necessarily make a good complaint, 9 1 although he
did concede that such a study, shaped to conform to the contours of the
fairness doctrine by meeting three basic requirements,92 might succeed as a
complaint.
93
Judge Bazelon, in a separate concurring opinion, refused to try to limit
the fairness doctrine by a strict construction of the prima facie require-
ment; 9 4 rather, he harpooned the doctrine, joining those who question its
constitutionality, and its effectiveness in promoting an informed public.95
In a stinging dissent, 96 Judge Wilkey asserted that the court's opinion
converted the prima facie rule into an open-ended prudential doctrine 9 7
which allowed the Commission to decline jurisdiction over hard cases. 98
Judge Wilkey charged that the court's opinion infused what should be a
precise standard with unprecedented discretion, 99 and called the court's in-
ability to discern the issues presented 'willful obtuseness.' "100 Concluding
that ASCEF's issue was specific enough, the dissent further contended that
if the FCC refused to aggregate the subissues into one general issue, it
certainly should have treated the subissues separately.' 0'
Cursory analysis of this decision might lead to the conclusion that, as
the dissent contended, the majority used the prima facie requirement as a
device to arbitrarily eliminate a fairness complaint which the Commission
did not want to process.' 02  It is submitted, however, that careful scrutiny
of the majority opinion reveals that it reflects a thoughtful attempt to apply
the prima facie rule in a way which best served its purpose of preventing
91. Id. (Wright, C.J., concurring).
92. Id. at 458-59 (Wright, C.J., concurring). According to Chief Judge Wright, such a study
must first be structured around a highly specific issue which can be identified and responded to
by the broadcaster. Id. at 458 (Wright, C.J., concurring). Second, the study must show a clear
and substantial correspondence between the issue it focuses upon and the topics treated by the
broadcaster. Id. (Wright, C.J., concurring). Finally, absolute objectivity must control its methods
and conclusions. Id. at 459 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
93. Id. at 459 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
94. Id. at 459-60 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 459 (Bazelon, J., concurring). See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
96. 607 F.2d at 460 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Wilkey was joined in his dissent-
ing opinion by Judges MacKinnon and Robb. Id.
97. Id. (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 465 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Cf. note 11 supra.
101. 607 F.2d at 468 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Finding no reason to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of non-specificity, Judge Wilkey went on to consider and reject the FCC's other
reasons for dismissal. Id. at 469-74 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). For a list of these reasons, see note
87 supra. Judge Wilkey maintained that the FCC's questioning of the methodology employed
by ASCEF addressed the merits of the case, an analysis inappropriate at the time for consider-
ing the pleading. Id. at 470 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). As to the Commission's displeasure with
the scope of the programming evaluated by the study, Judge Wilkey found that the requirement
of reviewing a reasonable amount of programming had been met. Id. at 472-73 (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at 460, 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See notes 96-98 and accompanying text supra.
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unnecessary encroachment on the first amendment's protection of broadcast-
ers. 103  Moreover, it is suggested that the majority's opinion is supported by
logic 104 and backed by precedent 105 except that in its extremely strict appli-
cation of the specificity requirement, the court refused to consider possibly
identifiable subissues 106 and, thus, may have departed from the more liberal
approach of some previous cases. 10 7
In determining the standard for judicial review of FCC cases, it is sub-
mitted that the court followed precedent by adopting a deferential standard
of review. 108 Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,10 9 it is submitted
that the court here rightly afforded "great weight"110 to the Commission's
experience in deciding particular cases on their facts, and in shaping policy
with regard to administration of the fairness doctrine in general."' There-
fore, it is suggested that the court correctly limited its decision to determin-
ing whether the Commission's action was supported by the evidence and
was within its legislated authority. 112
Regarding the constitutional questions addressed by the American Se-
curity Council court, it is contended that the court's sensitivity to the ten-
sion between those first amendment interests which the fairness doctrine
promotes 113 and those which it threatens 114 reflects a close reading of judi-
cial 115 and FCC 116 precedent regarding the goals of and limitations upon the
regulation of broadcasting. It is submitted that the court, in justifying the
103. See Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58
F.C.C.2d 691 (1976). See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra; notes 113-21 and accom-
panying text infra.
104. See notes 121-22 and accompanying text infra.
105. See notes 113-19 and accompanying text infra.
106. 607 F.2d at 448-52.
107. See notes 126-32 and accompanying text infra.
108. See 607 F.2d at 447-48; notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra. See generally Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973); Democratic
Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 912 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972) (court
held that it "was not at liberty to substitute its discretion for that of administrative officers who
have kept within the bounds of their administrative power").
109. See 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973). For a discussion of Columbia Broadcasting, see note 36
supra; notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
110. See 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973). Regarding the weight accorded to construction of legisla-
tion by the agency charged with its administration, see note 30 supra.
111. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
112. 607 F.2d at 447.
113. See id. at 443-44. The fairness doctrine was designed to facilitate the first amendment
goal of a balanced presentation of divergent views by encouraging citizens to monitor the media.
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 377, 390; Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1,
8 (1974); notes 25-26 & 33 and accompanying text supra; note 34 supra.
114. See 607 F.2d at 443-46; note 36 and accompanying text supra. While any attempt at
governmental regulation of the broadcast media carries some potential for first amendment
abuse, the fairness doctrine, with its focus on content, moves dangerously close to censorhsip.
See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 114-21.
115. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 393-94.
116. See Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58
F.C.C.2d 691, 695 (1976); In re Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1970).
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existence of the prima facie standard, 1 17 properly balanced the public's right
to know, which is promoted by the fairness doctrine, 118 against the need to
protect the broadcaster from undue burdens," 9 which could be threatened
by the doctrine.
With respect to the majority's recognition of the need for specificity in a
fairness doctrine complaint,12 0 it is suggested that the court's position is
supported by logic and practical necessity. As the court stated in an earlier
opinion, "[i]n law, as in philosophy, the task of ascertaining the sound rule
or precept often turns significantly on rigor in statement of the problem.
Nowhere is this more the case than in application of the fairness doc-
trine." 121 It is submitted that this principle is clearly demonstrated by the
facts of the instant case.
Had the court instructed the Commission to require CBS to respond to
ASCEF's complaint with the issue framed as "national security," it is
suggested that CBS would be faced with the extremely burdensome task of
reviewing virtually all its tapes and transcripts for 1971 to determine if a
reasonable balance of views had been presented on the vast number of sub-
issues encompassed by this broad topic. 2 2 Thus, it is suggested that by
requiring the issue to be specific and well-defined, the court limited the
broadcaster's task by narrowing the potentially voluminous evidence to only
that which would be relevant to the narrow topic addressed. However, look-
ing to the dissent's arguments, it is submitted that the court may have
applied the specificity requirement too restrictively by failing to address
identifiable subissues and, in so doing, may have departed from prece-
dent.123
In what is perhaps its most compelling criticism of the court's decision,
the dissent challenged the majority's dismissal of the complaint, contending
that if the Commission refused to treat "national security" as a general um-
brella issue, then it was at least obliged to consider identifiable subtopics
separately. 124 The majority disposed of this idea by throwing the ball back
to the petitioner and suggesting that the complaint could have focused on
each of the individual subtopics included within "national security." 125
Nevertheless, the majority's refusal to look for and independently consider
117. 607 F.2d at 452.
118. See id. at 443-44, 452. For a discussion of the fairness doctrine's goal of promoting an
informed public, see notes 17-33 and accompanying text supra.
119. 607 F.2d at 444-45, 452.
120. Id. at 449.
121. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516, F.2d 1101, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court
found that rigor in defining the issue was the first and most important step in framing fairness
complaint, stressing that it facilitated the entire judicial procedure). See generally Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976); In re
Hakki S. Tamimie, 42 F.C.C.2d 876 (1973).
122. 607 F.2d at 451; id. at 455 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
123. See notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra; notes 124-32 and accompanying text in-
fra.
124. 607 F.2d at 468 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 450.
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the imbedded subissues presents a departure from earlier cases such as
Green v. FCC.126  In Green, the court did look beyond a generally stated
issue in order to consider identifiable subissues.127  In In re Council on
Children, Media and Merchandising, the Commission, faced with three for-
mulations of an issue, translated them into a single comprehensive state-
ment. 128 These cases indicate a tendency on the part of the FCC and the
District of Columbia Circuit to look beyond the technical statement of the
issue to find the meaning intended by the petitioner. 129  Moreover, since
examining the subissues is consistent with the Commission's expressed re-
liance on citizen complaints to enforce the fairness doctrine, 130 and with the
federal courts' liberal approach to pleadings, 1 3 1 the court's apparent depar-
ture from these standards in the instant case seems, as the dissent alleges,
unwarranted. 132
Less convincing, however, is the dissent's charge that the majority in-
fused the prima facie rule with unprecedented discretion by using a free-
wheeling balancing of interests approach when applying the prima facie re-
quirement. 13 3  It is suggested, instead, that the majority used the balancing
of interests analysis when justifying the FCC's stringent prima facie case
requirement, 3 4 not in applying that rule.1
3 5
126. 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a discussion of Green, see notes 58-63 and accom-
panying text supra.
127. 447 F.2d at 329-31. See notes 58-63 and accompanying text supra.
128. 59 F.C.C.2d 448, 452 (1976). See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
129. It should be noted, however, that in Green the complaint was ultimately dismissed,
essentially on the ground that evidence of imbalance was not pleaded. 447 F.2d at 329-31.
130. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 8 (1974). Recognizing its own limitations, the FCC
has stated that effective enforcement of the fairness doctrine depends on the diligent efforts of
interested citizens. Broadcast Procedure Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1974).
131. See notes 57-63 and accompanying text supra.
132. 607 F.2d at 466, 469 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey alleged that
there is in this case ample evidence of imbalance separately concerning several of the
precise "component" issues which the majority conceded were sufficiently specific. For
example, ASCEF adduced evidence separately with regard to (1) U.S. involvement in
Vietnam, (2) Soviet foreign policy objectives, (3) detente with the Soviet Union, (4) the
appropriate relative military postures of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and (5) U.S. military
expenditures and SALT.
Id. at 468 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained:
[The majority] infuses the standard with an element of discretion, and hence vagueness,
painfully at odds with the precision customarily required of regulation affecting speech.
Contrary to the majority's assertion, there is simply no warrant in law for the sort of
free-wheeling "'balancing" of interests under cover of the prima facie evidence test which
the court today approves....
Id. (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 444-46. See notes 117-19 and accompanying text supra.
135. Noting that the prima facie evidence requirement is part of the delicate balance of
allocating burdens between licensees and complainants, the court justified the existence of this
requirement by applying the Commission's analysis as set forth in In re Allen C. Phelps, 21
F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1969). For a discussion of this analysis, see note. 42 supra. Then, following a
discussion of the burdens which vague complaints would impose on broadcasters and the possi-
ble chilling effect they might have on a licensee's handling of controversial issues, the court
stated that "[tihe prima facie case requirements are designed to weed outthose complaints that
would burden broadcasters without sufficient likelihood that a countervailing benefit would be
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The dissent further asserted that the majority's decision in this case in-
dicates that "the wagons are being drawn about the fairness doctrine" to
deflect worrisome complaints. 136  This criticism might appear troublesome
in view of the lengthy treatment of first amendment concerns engaged in by
the majority' 37 and concurring opinions. 138 Such treatment, it is suggested,
reveals the court's sympathy for, and, it might be argued, oversensitivity to
the constitutional interests of broadcasters. As suggested earlier, 139 however,
the court's attention to first amendment interests was directed at justifying
the existence of the prima facie rule, not at applying that standard. While it
could be contended that this court's quite apparent first amendment sym-
pathies might lead it to stretch the prima facie rule in such a way as to allow
the licensee to escape from a burdensome but meritorious complaint, it is
submitted that this is not the situation under the facts of this case since,
here, the court could reasonably find ASCEF's complaint vague, amorphous,
and insufficiently specific. 140  Indeed, it is submitted that this is the very
sort of complaint the standard is designed to weed out.141 Therefore, it is
suggested that the dissent's criticism, although a reasonable warning to bear
in mind for future litigation, was unfounded with regard to the instant case.
Finally, Judge Wilkey charged that if the position taken by the FCC
and the majority is sustained, and if the Commission remains unwilling to
consider complaints which include many subtopics under an umbrella issue,
it would be very difficult to make any major area of American life the sub-
ject of a fairness complaint. 142 Even more serious is the potential continua-
tion of this argument: that it would be impossible as well to bring a com-
plaint against a broadcaster for "pervasive and continuous imbalance"143 in
overall news programming since this necessarily would involve many subis-
sues. It is submitted that such an argument, while ostensibly accurate and
disturbing, fails because, as the majority suggests, complainants could raise
the subtopics individually, pleading the required elements for each particu-
lar issue.1 4 4
gained." 607 F.2d at 452. Thus, it is submitted that the court's purpose in considering so
carefully the first amendment concerns and the allocation of burdens was to justify application of
the prima facie requirement in screening fairness doctrine complaints, not to make decisions on
the basis of such considerations.
136. 607 F.2d at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
137. 607 F.2d at 443-46, 451.
138. Id. at 453-54, 458, 459 (Wright, C.J., concurring); id. at 459-60 (Bazelon, J., concur-
ring).
139. See notes 133-35 and accompanying text supra.
140. As pointed out by Chief Judge Wright in his concurring opinion, the petitioner's own
papers indicate that "national security" was ill-defined and indeterminate: "Its brief on appeal
... refers in places not to the national security issue but to 'national security issues.'" 607 F.2d
at 454 (Wright, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See note 88 supra.
141. See notes 37-47 & 85 and accompanying text supra.
142. Id. at 467 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 463 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
144. 607 F.2d at 450-51. See also notes 124-25 and accompanying text supra.
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the American Security Council court
showed a sensitivity to the need to shield the media from procedures that
might "chill" the "robust and wide open" debate crucial to our system of
government.' 45  As such, it is contended that the court's analysis represents
an accurate interpretation of the Supreme Court's first amendment stance, as
summed up in Red Lion 146 and New York Times v. Sullivan. 147 Precise
application of the long-standing prima facie standard allowed the court to
protect those first amendment constitutional goals in a way consistant with
logic and precedent.
When constitutional interests collide, one must necessarily yield to the
other in the balancing which ensues. Here, it is submitted that the court
wisely concluded that the first amendment purpose of guaranteeing an in-
formed public 148-the purpose which the conflicting interests1 49 in this case
were designed to promote-was best served by shielding the broadcaster
and increasing the burden on the individual citizen complainant. The court's
decision affirming the FCC's dismissal of ASCEF's complaint thus represents
a soundly reasoned decision.
Doris Del Tosto
145. See note 25 supra.
146. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See note 25 supra; notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra. It
should be noted that the first amendment is not intended to protect the right of the licensee to
broadcast whatever he wishes; rather, it protects the right of the public to hear various view-
points on a wide variety of issues. 395 U.S. at 390.
147. See 376 U.S. 254 (1964); note 25 supra. In New York Times, Justice Brennan observed
that there is a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 376 U.S. at 270.
148. See notes 25 & 67 supra; note 33 and accompanying text supra.
149. On one hand, the Commission's fairness doctrine policy encourages citizen monitoring
to ensure presentation of a balance of viewpoints on a variety of controversial issues of public
importance. See notes 57 & 130 supra. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that broadcasters are
protected by the first amendment, see note 27 supra, and acknowledges the danger of "chilling
robust debate" by too vigorous enforcement of the fairness doctrine. See notes 25, 36, 69 &
73-76 and accompanying text supra.
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